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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
INFORMATION ACCESS DISPUTES: 
A MODEST PROPOSAL-
DO NOTHING 
Neal Devins • 
B attles between Congress and the White House over the executive's obliga-tion to respond to congressional demands for information are legion. Start-
ing with George Washington's 1796 refusal to provide the House of Representa-
tives with correspondence relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty, 1 the legisla-
tive and executive branches have advanced dramatically different articulations of 
the reaches and limits of Congress' power to investigate executive branch opera-
tions. Reflecting deep-seated differences between executive and legislative branch 
sensibilities, these conflicts seem destined to continue. The Clinton justice Depart-
ment, for example, unsuccessfully fought an epic battle with the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee over the propriety of committee investigators interviewing 
"line attorneys" of the Department's environmental crimes unit. 2 
A remarkable feature of these battles is that Congress' ultimate weapon to 
bring the executive branch into compliance with its information requests, the 
subpoena power, appears very much dependent on executive branch officials. 
Specifically, were Congress to conclude that an executive branch official was 
in contempt for failing to comply with a congressional subpoena, the matter 
would then be turned over to the Justice Department. Were the White House 
to assert executive privilege, however, as was the case with Reagan's EPA 
Administrator Anne Burford, 3 the contempt finding almost certainly would go 
• Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of 
William and Mary. Thanks to Brooke Edinger, a 1994 graduate of the Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, who played a significant role in the researching and writing of this essay. Thanks also to 
Harold H. Bruff, John C. Grabow, and John 0. McGinnis for helpful comments on a preliminary 
draft of this essay. 
I. Washington, however, provided the requested information to the House. See Stephen W. 
Stathis, Executive Cooperation: Presidential Recognition of tk lnvestigativr Authority of Congress and the Courts , 
3 J.L. & PoL. 183, 188 (1986). 
2. See EPA's Criminal Etiforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
3. For an accounting of this dispute, see Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in 
a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress , 71 MtNN. L. REv . 461 , 
508-16 (1987). 
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unprosecuted/ for the Justice Department would never directly challenge a 
claim of presidential privilege . All of this has led some commentators to call 
for a revamping of the current system, by either empowering Congress or a 
judicially appointed independent counsel to prosecute contempt actions against 
recalcitrant executive officials . 5 
Congress, however, has declined these invitations to expand its authority. 
Indeed, Congress has rejected several modest alternative suggestions as well. 6 
An examination of the day-to-day workings of the existing system helps to 
explain why most congressional members and staffers are satisfied with this 
seemingly imperfect arrangement. Congressional committees are routinely able 
to get what they desire from agencies through direct requests and negotiation . 
While it is inevitable that these procedures will break down from time to time, 
as was the case when Anne Burford refused to turn over files relating to ongoing 
Superfund enforcement activities, such cathartic events are rare . They are so 
rare , in fact, that the Burford controversy is really the only relevant conflict 
that can be cited to illustrate "the problem." 
Asking the question, "What is the problem and how do we fix it? " may 
thus mislead the true inquiry. It is more appropriate to ask whether the absence 
of Burford-like controversies demonstrate the workability of the current system? 
Many factors contribute to the presence of the current arrangement. Longstand-
ing reliance on negotiation, compromise, and resolution have, in the past , re-
sulted in nonjudicial settlement. Countervailing institutional interests have 
guided this process, balancing congressional oversight and the executive's control 
of its own officials and agencies . While the terms of these solutions are often 
defined by how long and how hard each branch is willing to push its institutional 
agenda, neither the executive nor Congress is willing to trade concrete political 
solutions for something as abstract as the defense of executive or legislative 
prerogatives under the separation of powers. For example, rather than delaying 
confirmation hearings or cutting appropriations, executive agencies prefer to 
turn over requested information to Congress. As a consequence, it is to be 
expected that these processes not break down into disputes that result in (at 
least attempted) judicial resolution. Furthermore, as this essay will show, greater 
judicial involvement risks more harm than good . This essay therefore argues 
that, whatever its faults, the current system is far better than reform proposals 
that would create a judicial end point to conflicts that are now solved without 
judicial involvement. 
4. See Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted 
a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 OLC 
opinion]. 
5. See James Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege 
Disputes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (1984); Stanley M . Brand 
& Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress 
May Enfora Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U . L. REv. 71 (1986). 
Three of the authors of these articles, coincidentally, have worked in the legal counsel ' s offices of 
the House and Senate. 
6. See infra notes 99-10 l. 
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I. The Competing Interests of Congress and the Executive 
Information access disputes between Congress and the executive are animated 
by two themes: one of tension, which makes disputes likely to occur and one 
of cooperation, which moderates potentially explosive conflicts between the 
branches. The theme of tension is rooted in the ongoing tug-of-war between 
the executive and Congress over whether information access is necessary for 
Congress to perform its legislative duties or, alternatively, whether information 
access requests improperly intrude upon the executive's duty to administer gov-
ernmental programs. The theme of cooperation speaks to the incentives for 
Congress and the executive to reach an accommodation over information access, 
namely, Congress' desire to maintain controls over executive operations and 
the executive's concomitant desire for Congress to delegate authority to it 
through broadly worded legislative mandates. 
A. THE THEME OF TENSION 
The Constitution, while it speaks of legislative power being vested in the 
Congress and executive power belonging to the President, does not specifically 
demarcate the boundaries that divide executive and legislative powers. Without 
clear borders separating legislative and executive powers, each branch claims 
authority for itself that the other sees as its own. For the executive, Congress' 
desire to expand its lawmaking function is often characterized as micromanage-
ment, which intrudes upon its power to implement. 7 For the Congress, the 
executive seeks to expand its implementation authority into the gray area of 
lawmaking. 8 For both branches, the Constitution-and their inherent powers 
under it-supports their competing interpretations and bolsters their willingness 
to engage in conflict with the other. 
1. Congressional Right to Access 
Congress has broad investigatory powers to fulfill its responsibilities under 
the Constitution. Article I declares that, "All legislative powers ... shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives. " 9 A key element of Congress' ability to carry out 
this mandate depends on how much information is made available to it as it 
deliberates and then legislates. Absent access to accurate, relevant information, 
it would probably be impossible to legislate either effectively or wisely. 10 During 
his academic life, Woodrow Wilson wrote that Congress' free exercise of its 
7. See generally THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS oN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (L. 
Gordon Crovitz et al. eds., 1989). 
8. See Louis Fisher, Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology, in THE FETTERED PRESI· 
DENCY 139 (L. Gordon Crovitz et al. eds., 1989). 
9. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § I. 
10. According to Sen. J. William Fulbright, the power to investigate is "perhaps the most 
necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative function. The power to investigate provides 
the legislature with eyes and ears and a thinking mechanism." J. William Fulbright, Congressional 
Investigations: Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 441 (1951). 
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investigative power, especially when applied to gain information from the execu-
tive branch, is one of the most important protectors of liberty, as well as an 
indispensable element for wise legislation.'' 
Wilson is not alone in emphasizing the importance of congressional investiga-
tions. The Supreme Court, too, has given great weight to the congressional 
power of inquiry. In Barenblatt v. United States, 12 the Court held that the power 
to inquire and compel response is ''as penetrating and far-reaching as the poten-
tial power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution. " 13 In the words of 
Chief Justice Warren: 
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative 
process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration 
of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys 
of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the 
Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal 
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. 14 
Indeed, the subpoena power has been held to be an "indispensable ingredi-
ent'' of Congress' legislative powers. 15 In McGrain v. Daugherty, 16 the Court found 
that: 
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information 
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and 
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information-which not 
infrequently is true-recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience 
has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also 
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some 
means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. 17 
11. For Wilson: 
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government 
and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody 
the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting 
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country 
must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things 
and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling 
ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. 
The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. The 
argument is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient 
administration, but, more than that, that the only really self-governing people is that people 
which discusses and interrogates its administration. 
WooDROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GovERNMENT 303 (15th ed. 1913). 
12. 360 u.s. 109 (1959). 
13. /d. at 111. In the context of hearings held by the House Un-American Activities Committee 
during the 1950s, the Supreme Court took a highly deferential view to the scope of congressional 
investigations. The Court used rational basis language when it said, "we cannot say that the 
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals which first considered this case was wrong in concluding 
that 'the primary purposes of the inquiry were in aid of legislative processes.' " !d. at 133. 
14. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
15. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975). 
16. 273 u.s. 135 (1927). 
17. /d. at 175. 
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When Congress conducts investigations, the single formal tool it can use to 
compel the production of information it desires is the subpoena. A subpoena 
allows Congress to tell the agency unequivocally that Congress is entitled to 
the information and that any attempt to hinder its access will be futile. At the 
same time, "[s]ince Congress may only investigate into those areas in which 
it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which 
are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Govern-
ment. " 18 
2. Executive Privilege 
The executive, like Congress, has broad authority to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibilities. The constitutional command to the president to "take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed" 19 has been interpreted by the Justice 
Department as an "exclusive [grant of] constitutional authority to enforce federal 
laws. " 20 Beginning with George Washington, presidents from time-to-time have 
claimed that certain categories of information possessed by the executive branch 
are privileged and not subject to release. 21 Although it is not uncommon for 
executive branch officials to refer to this privilege in the midst of information 
disputes between the branches, its definition is more elusive than its use. As 
is true with Congress' subpoena power, the phrase appears nowhere in the 
Constitution, and lawyers for Congress and the White House strongly disagree 
as to its nature and extent. 22 But at least two generalizations can be made about 
its meaning. First, its existence has been clearly affirmed by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Nixon. 23 Second, it is generally defined as the privilege, available 
only to the president and those acting under his orders, to refuse to release 
information that falls in one of two categories. The first category includes all 
communications between the president and his closest advisors that occur during 
the process of deliberation and debate on matters coming before the president. 
The second includes information relating to matters that are ''within the exclu-
sive province or' the executive branch. 
Among the areas protected by the privilege, several are easily identified. These 
include powers that are constitutionally committed to the executive branch, such 
as details of foreign policy and treaty negotiation, nominations before they are 
18. Borenblott, 360 U.S. at 112. 
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3. 
20. 1984 OLC opinion, supra note 4, at 113. 
21. 1 WRITINGS OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 303-305 (mem. ed. 1903). 
22. Compare letter from William French Smith to Rep. John D. Dingell (Nov. 30, 1982) with 
letter from Stanley M. Brand to Rep. Dingell (Dec. 8, 1982), reprinted in EPA Withholding of Superfund 
Files: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 189, 220 (1982); 
compare letter from Morton Rosenberg to the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
(Oct. 15, 1993), reprinted in STAFF OF HousE CoMM. ON ENERGY AND CoMMERCE SuscoMM. ON 
OvERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 103D CoNe., 2D SEss., REPORT oN ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN 
AND REFORM IN THE jusTICE DEPARTMENT's ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM 321 (Comm. Print 
1994) with Benjamin R. Civilleti, Justice Unbalanced: Congress and Prosecutorial Discretion, Re-
marks Before the Heritage Foundation (Aug. 19, 1993) (transcript on file with the author). 
23. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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made, possible pardons, and matters of current military significance. In these 
areas, any information released by the president is made available as an exercise 
of executive discretion and cannot be compelled. 24 It is also the executive's 
position that Congress may not inquire into deliberative communications be-
tween the president and his advisors so that openness, honesty, trust, and confi-
dentiality will prevail in high-level policy discussions. This rationale was well-
stated in a memorandum prepared for the Attorney General William French 
Smith by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1984. It said that "[h]uman experience 
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well 
temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to 
the detriment of the decisionmaking process.' ' 25 
B. THE THEME oF CooPERATION 
The prospect of repeated acrimonious conflicts between the legislative and 
executive branches is acute. The invocation of executive privilege in response 
to congressional information requests, as Peter Shane has observed, seems more 
likely due to post-Watergate changes within the cultures of the executive and 
legislative branches. "On the executive side, the bureaucracy directly reporting 
to the president ... has tried repeatedly to increase centralized control over 
[executive branch operations]. . . . Correspondingly, the increasing number 
and complexity of administrative tasks at the national level has prompted a 
burgeoning of congressional staff and oversight.' ' 26 Despite this changing cul-
ture, however, Congress rarely makes use of its subpoena power and the presi-
dent rarely invokes executive privilege. The infrequency of such battles is a result 
of both the availability of alternative mechanisms to resolve disputes between the 
branches and the benefits that each branch receives by cooperating with the 
other. 
Congress and the executive have strong incentives to work with each other. 
For Congress, broadly worded statutes that set forth generalized objectives, but 
are silent on the details of administration, are far easier to enact than highly 
detailed legislation drat specifies the distribution of benefits and burdens. Making 
use of public choice theory, Harold Bruff has explained this phenomenon: "Se-
lecting a decision rule requires a prospective-and necessarily rough-judgment 
about which rule will produce the lowest sum of two kinds of costs: the decision 
costs of obtaining assent from the requisite number of participants and the 
external costs of decisions that disfavor a given participant.' ' 27 At the same 
24. LoUis FISHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNFLICTS BETWEEN CoNGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 172 (3d 
ed. 1991). 
25. 1984 OLC opinion, supra note 4, at 116. In 1982, Smith also asserted that "the interest 
of Congress in obtaining information for oversight purposes is ... considerably weaker than its 
interest when specific legislative proposals are in question.'' SuBCOMMITTEE ON OvERSIGHT AND 
INVESTIGATIONS, HousE CoMM. ON ENERGY AND CoMMERCE, 97TH CoNG., 1sT SEss., ExECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE: LEGAL OPINIONs REGARDING CLAIM oF PRESIDENT RoNALD REAGAN IN RESPONSE TO A 
SuBPOENA IssuED TO jAMES G. WATT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 3 (Comm. Print 1981). 
26. Shane, supra note 3, at 463-64. 
27. Harold H. Bruff, Legislative FoTTTUJiity, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REv. 207, 218 
(1984). 
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time, while Congress prefers to lower its decision costs by delegating power, 
Congress conditions that delegation on its ability to protect its institutional 
priorities "at the operational stage [when] it is much easier to predict the winners 
and losers from a change in the decision rules. " 28 For this reason, Congress 
has strong incentive to couch its delegation with mechanisms that enable it to 
"veto" administrative decisions that it disapproves of without enacting legisla-
tion. Likewise, Congress has strong incentives to insist that the executive share 
with it information necessary to monitor the administration of federal programs. 
The executive also benefits from these power-sharing arrangements. Witness 
the White House's participation in the establishment and the growth of the 
legislative veto, a procedure by which departments or agencies would make 
proposals that would become law unless Congress rejected them by a majority 
vote of either one or both houses of Congress. Originally proposed by Herbert 
Hoover in 1929, the legislative veto enabled Hoover to "make law" and reorga-
nize executive branch operations without subjecting his plan to the cumbersome 
and uncertain lawmaking process. 29 Over time, the legislative veto grew in 
popularity but became more controversial. Perceiving that Congress was using 
this procedure to micromanage its operations, the Reagan administration-
while willing to accept the legislative veto as a condition on its discretion by 
signing onto statutes containing legislative vetoes-successfully challenged the 
procedure's constitutionality in INS v. Chadha. 30 
Chadha, rather than suggesting that courts are likely to play a large role in 
resolving disputes between Congress and the White House over the line that 
separates lawmaking from administration, spoke to the forces that propel the 
legislative and executive branches to resolve informally their institutional dis-
putes with one another. In the decade after Chadha, 1983-1993, well over 200 
legislative vetoes have been enacted into law. Although presidential signing 
statements sometimes cite Chadha and proclaim that these measures will be 
treated "as having no legal force or effect, " 31 it is quite clear that affected 
agencies comply with legislative veto provisions. "Agencies cannot risk ... 
collisions with the committees that authorize their programs and provide 
funds. " 32 As Louis Fisher observed in his definitive study of this device, "[i]n 
one form or another, legislative vetoes will remain an important mechanism 
for reconciling legislative and executive interests. " 33 In fact, Fisher argued, 
'' [n]either Congress nor the executive branch wanted the static model of govern-
ment offered by the Court.' ' 34 
Information access disputes, as the next part details, tell a nearly identical 
28. Id. at 221. 
29. Set grotrally Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 273. 
30. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
31. WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND jUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: THE MEMOIRS 
OF AN ATTORNEY GENERAL 221 (1991). 
32. Fisher, supra note 29, at 288. 
33. ld. at 292. 
34. ld. 
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story. Congress and the White House, despite sometimes laying claim to each 
other's power, are dependent on one another. Congress needs to delegate in 
order to reduce the costs of legislation. The executive needs to accept conditions 
on delegated authority in order to facilitate Congress' willingness to transfer 
power through delegations. "Each branch," as John McGinnis put it, "is both 
a potential ally and adversary of the others, and is thus involved in . . . a 
'bargaining' or 'mixed motive' game in which there is a mixture of mutual 
dependence and conflict, of partnership and competition. " 35 
II. The Politics of Information Access Disputes 
Cooperation dominates most congressional requests for information, with the 
executive turning over the requested information as a matter of routine. On 
rare occasion, however, the executive resists information requests. When this 
occurs, a generally unworkable statutory enforcement scheme gives way to a 
negotiation process that brings together the themes of tension and cooperation. 
A. THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
Congress has available to it several formal mechanisms to secure enforcement 
of its subpoenas. The most basic option is its inherent power to punish contempt 
of Congress. 36 Like the subpoena power itself, inherent contempt is not explicitly 
provided for in the Constitution. Its validity is, however, well-established as an 
attribute of Congress' legislative authority. 37 First used to compel information 
production in 1812,38 contempt of Congress is invoked by sending the Sergeant-
at-Arms to arrest and imprison the offending individual. The offender is then 
held until she either gives up the information or is tried by the relevant house 
of Congress. 39 Not used since 1945, this power is of little practical relevance. 
As a result, refusals to comply with congressional subpoenas are enforced 
through one of two statutory alternatives, one criminal and the other civil. 
Criminal contempt had its origin in 1857, when Congress supplemented its 
inherent contempt power with a statute providing for criminal contempt. The 
law held that a witness who fails to appear before a congressional committee, 
or who appears but fails to testify or produce requested evidence, is guilty of 
a misdemeanor. Once convicted, the witness may be punished by a fine of not 
35. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A 
Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, 
at 293, 299. 
36. See generally, jAMES HAMILTON, THE PowER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS (1976); TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST (1974); RoNALD L. GoLDFARB, THE CoNTEMPT 
PowER (1963); CARL BEcK, CoNTEMPT OF CoNGRESs (1959); ERNEST J. EBERLING, CoNGRESSIONAL 
INVESTIGATIONS ( 1928); James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations in the Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926); C. S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 
U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1926). 
37. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 233 (1821). 
38. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 87. 
39. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 148-49 (1935). 
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less than $100 and not more than $1,000, and imprisonment of not less than 
one month and not more than 12 months. 40 The U.S. Code currently contains 
the same statute in sections 192 and 194 of Title 2. 41 
Filed by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, section 192 prosecu-
tions punish a witness for past defiance. Consequently, the defendant cannot 
purge herself of contempt by turning over the withheld documents or testi-
mony. 42 In proving its case, the burden rests with the prosecution to demonstrate 
that the defendant's refusal to comply with the subpoena was willful and that 
the withheld documents were relevant to the subject matter of the congressional 
investigation. 43 
Congress may also enforce its subpoenas under the Ethics in Government 
Act. 44 Passed in 1978, the Ethics Act included a whole range of provisions to 
adjust the balance of power between Congress and the President in the wake 
of the Watergate scandal. One of these adjustments authorized the Senate-
but not the House 45 -to bring a civil suit on its own behalf to enforce its subpoe-
nas. 46 The civil enforcement option is limited, however, because it authorizes 
a suit against any person subpoenaed except an officer or employee of the federal 
government. 47 Therefore, the Act cannot be used to subpoena any agency em-
ployees as a part of the oversight process. 
The procedure for a civil suit is as follows. Once a subpoena is issued, the 
Senate may pass a resolution directing the Senate Legal Counsel to bring a 
civil enforcement action. 48 The D.C. District Court is then given original juris-
diction and is required to hear the case as expeditiously as possible. 49 Once the 
court finds that the subpoena is valid and that the witness has failed to comply, 
enforcement is by the court's contempt power. 50 
40. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § I, 11 Stat. 155-56 (1859). 
41. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
42. Su Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 5, at 151 (discussing United States v. Brewster, 154 
F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1957)). 
43. Su Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 
(1957). 
44. Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). See also 2 U.S.C. § 288(d) (1993), 28 U.S.C. § 1365 
(1988). 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
46. The reason that only the Senate received this power is not entirely clear. The only indication 
in the legislative history is that the House had yet to fully consider the question and did not wish 
to have the power without giving it more attention. The committee report stated: 
The appropriate committees in the House also have not considered the Senate's proposal to 
confer jurisdiction on the courts to enforce subpoenas of House and Senate committees. The 
Senate has twice voted to confer such jurisdiction on the courts and desires at this time to confer 
jurisdiction on the courts to enforce Senate subpoenas. 
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978). 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). ("This section shall not apply to an action to enforce, to 
secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of, or to prevent a threatened refusal to 
comply with, any subpoena or order issued to an officer or employee of the Federal Government 
acting within his official capacity."). 
48. !d. 
49. 28 u.s.c. § 1365 (1988). 
50. 28 u.s.c. § 1365(b) (1988). 
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B. THE SvsTEM BREAKS DowN: THE CAsE OF ANNE G. BuRFORD 
The feasibility of the above statutory scheme was severely challenged in the 
fall of 1982, when a bitter dispute erupted between the Justice Department and 
two House Subcommittees on Oversight and Investigation-the Public Works 
and Transportation Committee and the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
The subcommittees had been looking into the EPA's enforcement of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA). 51 Specifically, the EPA was asked to turn over some files relating 
to its enforcement activities. The EPA initially indicated that it would cooperate 
with the investigation. However, the justice Department's Office of Legal Coun-
sel, after concluding that the files were privileged, instructed the EPA to hold 
onto the files. They took the position that files pertaining to ongoing enforcement 
activities were too sensitive to release because they contained confidential infor-
mation regarding evidence and litigation strategy. The EPA was concerned that 
any information they released to Congress would find its way into the news. 
Not only would this damage the government's prospects in litigation, but it 
would be highly damaging to those suspected of illegal activities when their 
identities would be released. 
After extended negotiations, the EPA indicated that it would allow access to 
files only after screening them for sensitive documents that would not be re-
leased. Unwilling to accept limited access, the subcommittees declined and issued 
subpoenas on November 22, 1982, against EPA Administrator Anne Burford. 52 
The Department of Justice took the view that release of law enforcement-related 
files would invade executive prerogatives and threaten the successful prosecution 
of CERCLA cases. Attorney General William French Smith sent a letter to 
the subcommittees in support of the administration's position. According to the 
Attorney General, "sensitive open law enforcement investigative files" could 
not be released. 53 To that end, President Reagan ordered Burford not to divulge 
documents from "open law enforcement files, [with] internal deliberative materi-
als containing enforcement strategy and statements of the Government's position 
on various legal issues which may be raised in enforcement actions. . . " 54 
The only access offered by the Attorney General was to documents that had 
been prescreened by the EPA. 
The General Counsel to the Clerk of the House, Stanley Brand, responded 
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under CERCLA, anyone who owns 
or has owned polluted property or who was ever in any way involved with polluting the property 
can be held as a "potential responsible party" and made to suffer joint and several liability for 
the cleanup costs. Under CERCLA a Superfund was established to pay for orphaned cleanups. 
The fund is replenished periodically by contributions from potentially responsible parties. Passed 
in 1980, CERCLA was in its early stages of operation when this conflict arose. President Reagan 
issued an executive order delegating CERCLA administration authority to the EPA Administrator. 
Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1982). 
52. H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., !ld Sess. 11-13 (1982). 
53. Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to Hon. John D. Dingell (Nov. 30, 
1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 968, at 37-41. 
54. H.R. REP. No. 968, at 42-43. 
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with a letter to the subcommittees answering the Attorney General's letter and 
justifying the House position. 55 The same day, the subcommittees made a settle-
ment offer to the EPA. Their proposal was that staff on the subcommittees 
would review the documents at the EPA, thereby allowing all the documents 
to remain in EPA possession at all times. Selected documents would be marked 
by subcommittee staffers and then given to the EPA staff. The EPA would 
review them to determine the sensitivity of their content. If the content was 
acceptable for release, then the documents would be released to the subcommit-
tees. If the documents were too sensitive, however, they would not be released. 
Instead, subcommittee staffers would only be able to review them at the EPA. 
All the information in sensitive documents would remain confidential. 56 This 
offer was, however, rejected by the EPA. 
On December 10, 1982, the subcommittees responded to the EPA refusal: 
the subpoenas would be enforced. The full Public Works and Transportation 
Committee voted along party lines to recommend that the House resolve to 
hold Burford in contempt; the House agreed, and on December 16 voted Burford 
in contempt by a margin of 259 to 105. 57 
Before the Speaker of the House could certify the contempt to U.S. Attorney 
Stanley Harris, however, a suit was filed by Burford, the Department of justice, 
and Harris, seeking a declaratory judgment that Burford had acted lawfully in 
refusing to release the subpoenaed documents. 58 The D.C. District Court refused 
to hear the suit on the grounds that a judicial resolution would be an improper 
remedy, concluding that the proper forum to raise a constitutional argument 
would be as a defense to a section 194 proceeding. 59 The court's ruling seemed 
to promote a resolution, as an agreement was soon reached. Ultimately, the 
issue turned less on the merits of the information access dispute and more on 
the public perception that the allegations of lax EPA enforcement were true. 
Some negotiations and two months later, the information was released to the 
subcommittees and Burford resigned from her post at the EPA. 
Although Congress succeeded in getting the information it requested, the 
Burford controversy can be seen as evidence that Congress' subpoena enforce-
ment powers under section 194 are inadequate if the subpoenaed party refuses 
to cooperate. In order for Congress to satisfy its information needs, it must 
rely on the cooperation of the U.S. Attorney. But when the request is made 
of an executive branch official, the Department of Justice may have considerable 
incentives to refuse to cooperate. Claims of executive privilege, the oath of 
55. Memorandum from Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Hon. Elliott H. Levitas (Dec. 8, 1982) (Attorney General's Letter Concerning 
Subpoena For Documents to Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency), reprinted in H.R. 
REP. No. 968, at 58-64. 
56. H.R. REP. No. 968, at 20-21. 
57. Joseph A. Davis, Congress Sees Foot-Dragging: Gorsuch Contempt Charge Puts Focus on Enforcement 
of Hazardous Waste Laws, 40 GoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3162 (1982). See also H.R. Res. 632, 97th 
Gong., 2d Sess., 128 GONG. REG. 31,754 (1982) (enacted). 
58. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 151 (D.D.C. 1983). 
59. /d. at 152-53. 
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office, and basic considerations of separation of powers all may persuade the 
executive that cooperation is inconsistent with its institutional duty to preserve 
and defend the Constitution. Indeed, in an Office of Legal Counsel opinion 
issued in the aftermath of this dispute, the Justice Department concluded that 
"[a]s a .matter of statutory construction and separation of powers analysis, a 
United States Attorney is not required ... to prosecute an Executive Branch 
official who carries out the president's instruction to invoke the president's claim 
of executive privilege before a committee of Congress.' '60 
Congress, however, did not seek to beef up its subpoena enforcement authority 
in the wake of this controversy. One explanation is that, throughout the dispute, 
it was the Justice Department and not the EPA that sought to withhold the 
documents from Congress. 61 In other words, the Burford dispute was a bit of 
an anomaly. Agency heads, as will be discussed, will be able to (and will have 
incentive to) skirt Justice Department participation in nearly every instance. 62 
Furthermore, Congress has available to it effective alternatives to subpoena 
enforcement actions. 
C. NEGOTIATING INFORMATION-CURRENT PRACTICEs63 
The uniqueness of the Burford dispute is a byproduct of an Office of Legal 
Counsel decision to treat Congress' information request as a test case in which 
to push the bounds of executive privilege. Consequently, as James Michael 
Strine reports in his detailed work on Office of Legal Counsel operations, the 
Office of Legal Counsel's institutional interests in executive privilege outweighed 
the organizational and strategic needs of the White House and the EPA. 64 By 
discounting EPA and White House desires to maintain good relations with 
congressional overseers, the Office of Legal Counsel maximized its longstanding 
interest in protecting presidential authority. Without the political incentives that 
make the executive willing to turn over information to Congress, the theme of 
tension predominated over executive branch conduct in this dispute. Congress 
responded in kind. The House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommit-
tee on Oversight Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.) aggressively pursued con-
gressional priorities and was quite willing to accentuate the theme of tension 
60. 1984 OLC Opinion, supra note 4, at 101. 
61. Burford very much wanted to turn the documents over and bitterly complained that Robert 
Perry, then EPA's General Counsel, was holding onto the documents because Justice wanted him 
to and that Perry "my General Counsel, was working more for the Justice Department than for 
me." ANNE M. BuRFORD & jOHN GREENYA, ARE You TouGH ENOUGH: AN INSIDER's VIEW OF 
WASHINGTON PoLITICS 154 (1986). 
62. See infra notes 137-46. 
63. This subsection title is borrowed from Peter Shane's excellent Administrative Conference 
report on information access disputes between the Congress and executive. Peter M. Shane, Negotiat-
ing for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Iriformation, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 
197 (1992). Portions of my discussion in this section borrow from Shane's report and I thank Dean 
Shane for his willingness to share his source material, correspondence, and insights with me. 
64. James M. Strine, The Office of Legal Counsel: Legal Professionals in a Political System 
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins Univ.). 
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in his dealings with the executive. 65 Furthermore, Dingell , a ranking member 
of the Democratic leadership, had strong incentive to politically embarrass Re-
publican heads of the EPA and Justice Department. 66 Under these conditions, 
it is not surprising that the EPA dispute would make its way into court. 
The EPA controversy, however, stands outside of the pattern of information 
access disputes between the executive and legislative branches. No other infor-
mation access case has made it to court since the EPA controversy . Indeed, in 
the midst of this controversy, President Reagan issued a memorandum to the 
heads of executive departments and agencies making it administration policy 
to "comply with congressional requests for information. " 67 While the memoran-
dum exempts "substantial question[s) of executive privilege from this policy," 
the determination of whether an information access request raises a substantial 
question of executive privilege is left to the agency or department head. 68 Given 
the costs to an agency or department of a protracted executive privilege fight with 
its congressional overseers, department and agency referrals are quite rare. 69 For 
this reason, etherial concerns of separation of powers typically give way to more 
immediate pressures of maximizing political capital. 70 The leadership role played 
by the Office of Legal Counsel throughout the EPA dispute therefore stands 
as a counter-example to the normal executive branch practice of turning informa-
tion over to Congress. 
Executive privilege concerns, when raised, are typically resolved through 
a process of compromise and negotiation. In some instances, the mechanisms 
for such compromise are formalized. For example, the House and Senate 
Committees on Intelligence have adopted a standing order that defines the 
procedures in which information between the branches is shared . Under this 
modus operandi : 
65. Shane, supra note 63, at 221. 
66. For similar reasons, the Republican Congress of 1995 has threatened to make use of its 
subpoena authority to compel the Clinton White House to turn over potentially embarrassing 
documents . Paul Beddard, Clinton May Cite Executive Privilege; Travelgate Papers at Center of Tussle, 
WAsH. TtMES, Sept. 8 , 1995, at AI ; Laurie Kellman , Subpoena Threat Forces Whitt House Hand; Panel 
Members Could See Waco Papers, WASH. TIMES, July II, 1995, at AI. Along the same lines , when 
the same party controls the Congress and the White House, party loyalty checks (but does not 
prevent) executive-legislative conflicts. 
67. Memorandum from President Ronald Reagan to the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information (Nov . 4, 
1982) (on file with author). 
68. ld. 
69. Telephone Interview with John 0. McGinnis, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel (Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter McGinnis Interview]. 
70. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 17 (arguing 
that the president is less interested in preserving separation of powers than in achieving the policy 
outcomes he favors); John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and 
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP . PRoss ., 
Autumn 1993, at 293, 324 (noting that the Office of Legal Counsel, because it is "responsible for 
the separation of powers that cut across various issues,'' is far less willing to bargain away presidential 
authority, whereas the operating divisions of the executive branch "are often more interested in 
making bargains that will advance the specific part of the president's policy for which they are 
responsible . "). 
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1. Committee employees must agree in writing to abide by committee rules 
and must receive an appropriate security clearance before receiving access 
to classified information; 
2. Members of the committees are forbidden to disclose information individually 
if the rules provide that such information may be released only pursuant to 
committee vote; 
3. The president may object to a committee vote to disclose properly classified 
information submitted to it by the executive branch, in which case the infor-
mation may be disclosed only pursuant to a vote of the entire House; and 
4. The committees may regulate and must record the sharing of information 
made available to them with other committees or with any member of Con-
gress not on the committees. 71 
In a 1990 interview with Peter Shane, Britt Snider, then-general counsel to the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence, heralded this standing order as a means for 
ensuring smooth relations between the branches by establishing an orderly, predict-
able process and setting forth a reasonable set of congressional expectations. 72 
Outside of foreign relations, where the possibility is substantial that informa-
tion access requests will raise executive privilege concerns, formalized procedures 
are unnecessary. In some instances, the executive will waive executive privilege 
claims in order to accomplish its political objective. In other instances, an inter-
mediate solution is reached. Types of intermediate options include the executive 
providing the requested information in timed stages, the executive releasing 
expurgated or redacted versions of the information, the executive preparing 
summaries of the information, Congress promising to maintain confidentiality 
regarding the information, and Congress inspecting the material while it remains 
m executive custody. 73 
D. WAIVERS OF ExECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
It is hardly unusual for the president to forego an executive privilege claim 
by releasing informa~ion in order to advance his political agenda. This was seen 
when Congress demanded copies of internal memoranda written by William 
Rehnquist when he served in the Department of Justice under President Nixon 
between 1969 and 1971. 74 Congress demanded access when Rehnquist was nomi-
nated by President Reagan in 1986 to be advanced from Associate Justice to 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 75 The president initially refused to release 
the memoranda on the grounds that they were protected by the deliberative 
process privilege. 76 A strong argument could be made that no obligation existed 
on the part of the president to release these memoranda, as they constituted 
71. Shane, supra note 63, at 215 (footnotes omitted). 
72. !d. at 215-16. 
73. !d. at 218-19. 
74. FISHER, supra note 24, at 173. 
75. AI Kamen & Ruth Marcus, Reagan Uses Executive Privilege to Keep Rehnquist Memos Secret: 
Senate Denied Access to Nixon-Era Papers, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 1, 1986, at AI. 
76. !d. 
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the sort of deliberative remarks among the president and his advisors that can 
receive the protection of executive privilege. But despite his right to assert the 
privilege, Reagan decided to release them anyway. 77 By giving them up, the 
executive was able to ease the effect of confirmation politicking and to move 
Rehnquist's nomination through the Senate. 78 
The president's failure to advance an executive privilege claim, however, 
does not ensure swift, nonadversarial resolution of an information access dispute. 
This is a lesson from the recent imbroglio over environmental crimes prosecu-
tions between the Justice Department's Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) 
and the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Over-
sight, chaired at that time by John Dingell. 
This dispute originated in 1992 when complaints were made to Congress over 
the ECS's handling of six environmental prosecutions that were later identified 
by Dingell's subcommittee as examples of improper interference by ECS offi-
cials. A different congressional subcommittee had already investigated the matter 
and concluded that the ECS had displayed a ''pronounced failure to prosecute 
environmental crimes" to the same degree as conventional crimes. 79 EPA offi-
cials and others had complained that ECS supervisors had intervened in prosecu-
torial decisions by urging lower charges and fines instead of the more severe 
charges preferred by the non-ECS prosecutors. This issue was raised in Bill 
Clinton's presidential campaign when he charged that, "[t]he Bush administra-
tion is letting criminals off the hook after they pollute our air and our water and 
our land. " 80 But " [ w ]orse still," the candidate said, "the Bush administration is 
letting politics get in the way of prosecutions.' '81 
When Attorney General Janet Reno was confirmed to her post in 1993, 
she promised to investigate the allegations and make a report of her findings. 
Then-Associate Attorney General Webster Hubble was assigned the task of 
managing the investigation. To assuage congressional concerns, Reno allowed 
Dingell's subcommittee greater access to DO] documents and personnel. 
Dingell's staff even interviewed the ECS attorneys who had been involved with 
the six cases at the center of the allegations. 82 Once the internal investigation 
was initiated in June 1993, little occurred through the end of the year. 
77. Howard Kurtz & AI Kamen, Rehnquist Not in Dangtr Ovtr Papm: Sen. Mathias Finds 'Nothing 
Dramatic', WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1986, at AI. 
78. The same thing happened in 1988 when Stephen Trott's nomination to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was helped by the release of some Justice Department papers. Ruth Marcus, 
Impasse Ovtr Justice Documents Ends: Paptrs Turned Ovtr; Senate Confirms Trott to Court of Appeals, WASH. 
PosT, Mar. 25, 1988, at A23. 
79. Reid P.F. Stuntz, Remarks Before American Law Institute-American Bar Association, 
Course of Study: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law II (Oct. 7, 1993) (transcript on 
file with author) [hereinafter Stuntz Remarks]. 
80. Jim McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers Under Reno, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1994, 
at A25. 
81. /d. 
82. Such openness is rarely allowed by Do] because of the risk that prosecutors would be 
influenced to prosecute where otherwise they might not when they know that congressional commit-
tees may call them in for interrogation. On congressional oversight of the Justice Department, see 
gtntrally Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in American Public Law, American 
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Then, in a January 1994 letter to the Attorney General, Dingell alleged that 
the Department of Justice had been dragging its feet in a way that "repudiates 
the spirit of cooperation which you personally promised me. " 83 The president 
bowed out of the dispute with a letter from communications director Mark 
Gearan stating that "[t]he White House has decided to have the Department 
of Justice make a determination in this matter.' ' 84 In addition, the letter stated 
that the president "will not assert any privilege or waiver" in the matter. 85 
The controversy resurfaced on Friday, March 11, 1994, when Dingell' s sub-
committee served subpoenas on the ECS officials, naming Attorney General 
Reno and Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural 
Resources Division Lois Schiffer. The subcommittee demanded internal docu-
ments relating to the six cases at the center of the controversy. In addition, 
the panel sought information relating to changes in policy in the U.S. Attorney's 
manual that took effect on January 12, 1993. The manual was changed in a 
way that gave ECS in Washington even more control over environmental litiga-
tion around the country. 
The final step taken by the subcommittee came in the form of two letters to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, one from Dingell and one from Dan Schaefer 
(R-Colo.). The letters requested the Judiciary Committee to put a halt to Ms. 
Schiffer's confirmation hearings to her post as head of the Environment Divi-
• 86 
s10n. 
The subpoenas and the confirmation delay apparently had their desired effect. 
By Monday, March 14, the DOJ report, which had been in the works for nine 
months, was released. In it, the authors rejected charges of intentional interfer-
ence with criminal environmental prosecutions. Instead, the report found that 
the decisions made were within the range of normal prosecutorial discretion. 
It did note that two Republican appointees, in particular, took a less aggressive 
view on prosecutions, but concluded that their differing view did not amount 
to interference. The report further concluded that there was a pervasive distrust 
and "frequent absence of teamwork and mutual respect" between the DOJ 
and the EPA and that this resulted in the allegations. 87 
Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Legal and Historical Substantiality of Former Attornry 
General Civiletti's Views as to the Scope and Reach of Congress' Authority to Conduct Oversight of the Department 
of justice (Oct. 15, 1993), reprinted in EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 
12-41 (1993). 
83. STAFF OF SuscoMM. ON OvERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HousE CoMM. ON ENERGY AND 
CoMMERCE, 103D CONG. 2D SEss., DAMAGING DISARRAY: ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN AND REFORM 
IN THE jUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM 368 (Comm. Print 1994) (herein-
after DAMAGING DISARRAY]. 
84. Jim McGee, House Panel Subpoenas justice,· Documents Sought on Environmental Crime Cases, Policy 
Change, WASH. PosT, Mar. 12, 1994, at A4. 
85. /d. 
86. Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell to Sen. Joseph R. Eiden (Feb. 25, 1994), reprinted in 
DAMAGING DISARRAY, supra note 83, at 391. 
87. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to the Associate Attorney General: Internal Review of the 
Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Program 12 (Mar. 10, 1994) (on file with author). 
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This confrontation illustrates how a dispute such as this can be handled . The 
underlying issue was ECS's enforcement of criminal environmental laws. The 
Department of Justice, having promised to investigate and report back, had 
yet to tell the committee of its conclusions. Dingell's subcommittee, then, had 
Ms. Schiffer's confirmation delayed until it received the cooperation it de-
manded. The final result is that the executive's recalcitrance washed away under 
the pressure of the confirmation delay tactics . Of at least equal significance, the 
department modified its Attorney's Manual to bring it in line with subcommittee 
demands and Neil Cartusciello, the Justice Department official who headed ECS 
during this dispute, resigned from his post. 88 
Information access, in the end, was only the tip of the iceberg for the Oversight 
Subcommittee-Justice Department dispute . Although the subcommittee staff 
was eager to teach the Justice Department a lesson about Congress' oversight 
powers, oversight ultimately played a subordinate role to the merits of ECS's 
enforcement. 89 The bottom line for subcommittee staffers, as revealed by then-
committee staff director Reid P.F . Stuntz, was to bring ECS's practices in line 
with U.S. Attorney-driven criminal enforcement .90 
E. INTERMEDIATE SoLUTIONS TO INFORMATION AccEss DISPUTES 
Rather than having the executive unconditionally turn over all requested 
information to Congress or having the Congress withdraw its request for infor-
mation altogether, information access disputes are typically worked out through 
one of several intermediate options .91 Sometimes these accommodations seem 
little more than a device enabling one or the other branch (usually the executive) 
to save face . For example, when Ford Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton 
released copies of all boycott requests filed by U .S. companies under the Export 
Administration Act, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
agreed to protect the confidentiality of the demanded documents. 92 This 
agreement, however, was a symbolic concession to Morton, who feared an 
imminent contempt of Congress resolution .93 Carter Secretary of Energy James 
B. Edwards likewise sought to escape a contempt citation by agreeing to present 
to the House Committee on Governmental Operations all requested documents 
concerning their petroleum import fee program .94 Unlike Morton, the committee 
88. Jim McGee , Environmmtal Prosecutions Decmtralized, WASH. PosT, Aug. 26 , 1994, at A23 ; 
Jim McGee, Chief of Environmental Crimes Section Quits, WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1994, at A4. 
89. Stuntz Remarks, supra note 79. 
90. !d. 
91. For overview treatments, see Stathis, supra note I; History of Refusals by Executive Branch 
Officials to Provide Information Demanded by Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 751 (1982) 
[hereinafter 1982 OLC opinion). 
92. See Shane, supra note 63, at 202-203; Elder Witt, Oil Import Fee Dispute: Carter Foiled in First 
Tilt With Executive Privilege, 38 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1352 (1980) . 
93. See 121 CoNG. REc. 36,038-39 (1975) (contempt proceedings against Sec. of Commerce 
Rogers C.B. Morton); 121 CoNe. REc. 40,230 (1975) (subpoena complied with). 
94. See THE PETROLEUM IMPORT FEE: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OvERSIGHT, H.R. REP. No . 
1099, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980). 
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refused to prom1se confidentiality and agreed only to review the materials in 
executive session. 95 
Many intermediate approaches represent true compromises between the 
branches. The Standing Order of the Intelligence Committees, discussed 
above, 96 represents one such intermediate approach. Most intermediate options, 
rather than being formally memorialized, are ad hoc solutions to legislative-
executive conflicts. In a dispute between Reagan Secretary of Interior James 
Watt and the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight, mate-
rials related to the implementation of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act were 
"made available for one day at Congress under the custody of a representative 
from the Office of Counsel to the President. Minimal note-taking, but no photo-
copying, was permitted; the documents were available for examination by Mem-
bers Only. " 97 Another intermediate solution was reached in a Bush-era dispute 
between a subcommittee of the House Committee on Governmental Operations 
and the Internal Revenue Service; the conflict arose out of a congressional 
examination of alleged corruption in IRS auditing. The subcommittee and the 
Service agreed to an elaborate procedure in which "(1) [subcommittee] staff 
would have access at IRS to all the information requested, (2) staff could takes 
[sic] notes on the documents, (3) the documents would remain within IRS 
custody, and ( 4) the subcommittee would not publicly rely on any data garnered 
from the documents unless it was confirmed from another source. " 98 
Intermediate approaches, while avoiding much of the acrimony of Burford-like 
controversies, are hardly a panacea. Dispute resolutions can eat up a great deal 
of staff resources (from both sides) and can take several months. 99 Furthermore, 
negotiations, since they are principally done on an ad hoc basis, are as dependent 
on the skills of the negotiators and the political climate as much as they are 
on the strengths of the executive's claim of privilege and the Congress' claim 
of relevancy. 100 
III. The Workability of the Current System 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the current system is its persistence. 
Established in 1857, the formal mechanism of the U.S. Attorney's prosecution 
of contempt of Congress violations remains in place today. While legal commen-
tators, congressional staffers, and members of Congress sometimes call for an 
adjustment to this statutory scheme, all efforts to modify the 1857 law, at least 
with respect to executive branch officials, have failed. 
95. See Shane, supra note 63, at 204-205. 
96. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
97. 1982 OLC opinion, supra note 91, at 780. 
98. Shane, supra note 63, at 214. 
99. See Shane, supra note 63, at 228; Telephone Interview with Reed P.F. Stuntz, former 
counsel to the Oversight Subcomm. of the House Energy and Commerce Comm. (Mar. 24, 1994) 
[hereinafter Stuntz Interview]. 
100. See Shane, supra note 63, at 220-22. 
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What makes the failure of reform proposals all the more surprising is that 
reform efforts are almost always an outgrowth of a fierce executive-legislative 
conflict, a conflict that calls into question the workability of the current system. 
Watergate, the Reagan-EPA dispute, Iran-Contra, and now the environmental 
crimes conflagration are examples of this phenomenon. In each instance, how-
ever, Congress has failed to amend the 1857 scheme. This failure is a result 
of two interrelated phenomena. First, most proposals for change, by envisioning 
a broader judicial role in the policing of executive-legislative conflicts, raise 
problems of their own. Second, whatever its pitfalls, congressional and executive 
interests are generally satisfied with the current arrangement. 101 
A. jumciAL INTERVENTION IN INFORMATION AccEss DISPUTEs 
Statutory reform proposals, for the most part, are premised on judicial en-
forcement of executive branch refusals to turn over information to the Congress. 
Proposals either strengthen criminal law enforcement, by authorizing the ap-
pointment of a special prosecutor in executive privilege disputes, or civil enforce-
ment, by modifying or lifting altogether the exemption to executive branch 
officials under the Ethics in Government Act. 
1. Criminal versus Civil Enforcement 
The logic of expanding criminal enforcement through the use of special prose-
cutors is that the current statutory scheme treats contempt as a crime and, 
consequently, it makes little sense to decriminalize contempt simply because 
U.S. Attorneys are unwilling to bring such cases against executive branch offi-
cials. The solution, under this reasoning, is to follow the court-appointed, inde-
pendent counsel model used to prosecute executive officials in other contexts. 102 
This argument has been effectively criticized on two distinct grounds. First, 
whereas a civil enforcement mechanism only requires that the plaintiff prove 
her case by the preponderance of the evidence standard, a criminal case must 
be proved by the prosecutor to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 103 This 
higher burden of proof makes conviction considerably more difficult. Also, the 
government cannot appeal a criminal acquittal, while both the plaintiff and 
defendant in a civil suit have a right of appeal after a loss. 
Second, the imposition of criminal penalties may well be too harsh for the 
circumstances. In the context of congressional oversight, a recalcitrant executive 
branch witness or evidence-holder would not, in all likelihood, make an indepen-
101. McGinnis Interview, supra note 69; Telephone Interview with Michael Davidson, Senate 
Legal Counsel (Mar. 29, 1994) [hereinafter Davidson Interview]; Telephone Interview with Linda 
Gustitus, Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Senate Oversight Subcomm. of Government Manage-
ment and Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 1994) [hereinafter Gustitus Interview]. 
102. Brand & Connelly, supra note 5, at 89. 
103. The prosecution must prove that the defendant's refusal to comply with the subpoena is 
willful. Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147, 151 (1958); Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 
100 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948). Additionally, the prosecution must prove 
that the subpoenaed material is pertinent to the subject matter of the investigation. Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957). 
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dent decision to withhold the requested information from Congress. It is more 
likely the case that a witness would be uncooperative when the president orders 
her not to comply with the subpoena. Using a criminal sanction in such a 
situation amounts to punishing the witness for a political decision made by the 
president. This result may lead members of Congress to decide, at the outset, 
that a criminal prosecution should not be pursued at all, despite its availability. 
Furthermore, as James Hamilton and John C . Grabow have argued, the use 
of criminal contempt sanctions in executive privilege disputes: 
may be unfair to an executive official following the President's orders. A witness 'acts 
at his own peril' because a mistaken view of the law is no defense . The fact that a 
witness was acting under the orders of a superior authority does not appear to constitute 
a valid defense . 10' 
Compounding this unfairness, as the Office of Legal Counsel has argued, 
criminal prosecution of a witness who claims executive privilege would undercut 
the privilege altogether, for executive officials would be confronted with signifi-
cant disincentive to cooperate with the president's order to protect informa-
tion. 105 Because of these and other difficulties, it is also possible that courts will 
resist upholding such prosecutions. 106 
For the reasons stated above, Hamilton and Grabow have proposed that 
civil enforcement under the Ethics in Government Act be augmented to allow 
enforcement against officials of the federal government. 107 Under their proposal, 
either house, not just the Senate, would be able to bring a civil enforcement 
suit in the D.C. District Court. Once a subpoena is issued by an authorized 
committee or subcommittee, the committee could report a resolution to the 
whole house to have the subpoena enforced. Once the whole body had voted 
to enforce the subpoena, an attorney chosen by that house would be authorized 
to bring suit to enforce the subpoena. 
A modified version of this civil enforcement proposal was considered by the 
Congress in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair. During Iran-Contra, the 
system of sharing information between Congress and the executive broke down. 
104. Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 5, at 156 (footnotes omitted). 
105. 1984 OLC opinion, supra note 4, at 136. 
106. Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 5, at 157. 
107. They suggest that civil enforcement under the Ethics in Government Act could be augmented 
by adding a section. Section 1364(a) would read as follows: 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, without regard to the amount 
in controversy, shall have original jurisdiction over, and shall hear, any civil action brought by 
either House of Congress or any authorized committee or subcommittee of such House, or any 
joint committee of Congress, to enforce or secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity 
of any subpoena or order issued by such House, or any such committee or subcommittee, to 
any officer or employee of the Federal Government, acting within his or her official capacity, 
to secure the production of documents or other materials of any kind or the answering of any 
deposition or interrogatory or to secure testimony of any combination there.of. Either House of 
Congress, or any authorized committee or subcommittee , may prosecute a civil action under 
this section in its own name. 
/d. at 171-72. 
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The congressional committees investigating this episode were unanimous in 
concluding that "officials of the National Security Council misled the Congress 
and other members of the Administration about their activities in support of 
the Nicaraguan Resistance. " 108 Among a spate of proposals designed to improve 
congressional operations in the wake of Iran-Contra, the majority report of the 
Iran-Contra committee proposed that the Senate's civil enforcement authority 
be augmented to allow for suits against government officials, thereby making 
subpoena enforcement available as a tool in the oversight process. 109 
The Justice Department opposed this measure, arguing that the judicial 
branch should play a limited role in settling information access disputes since 
the Framers of the Constitution intended that these conflicts would be fought 
predominately in the political arena. 110 Through negotiations between the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Justice Department, this proposal 
was modified. Under the reformulated proposal, an exemption to Senate enforce-
ment would apply whenever an agency head, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, ordered the individual in possession of the requested information not 
to comply."' When the amendment came to a vote on August 9, 1988, it passed 
the Senate on a voice vote. The House voted on October 6, 1988, giving the 
amendment strong support with a 245-172 vote in favor. 112 For procedural rea-
sons, though, this was not enough for it to pass. The measure came up as 
unfinished business on a motion to suspend the rules and, as a result, required 
a two-thirds supermajority to pass. After this, no further action was taken by 
either house. 
Proposals to modify the Ethics in Government Act avoid the principal pitfalls 
of criminal enforcement save one, namely, the increasing participation offederal 
courts in resolving information access disputes. The question of whether judicial 
enforcement should be expanded in information access disputes therefore must 
be addressed. 
2. Is judicial Enforcement Appropriate) 
There is intuitive appeal to expanding judicial enforcement of executive-
legislative information access disputes. Reform proposals, as noted, are invari-
ably the outgrowth of divisive conflicts between the elected branches. Neverthe-
less, reform proposals fade away as the controversies that prompted them are 
resolved through political means. Post-Watergate reforms, granting jurisdiction 
to courts with respect to any claim of executive privilege asserted before either 
108. H.R. REP. No. 433, tOOth Cong., 1st. Sess. 447 (1987) (minority report of Rep. Cheney 
et al.). This is also cited asS. REP. No. 216, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
109. !d. at 426 (recommendations of the majority). 
110. Letter from Thomas Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, to John Glenn, Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Uun. 24, 1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter Boyd letter]. 
Ill. HousE CoMM. ON THEjuotctARY, REPORT CLARIFYING THE INVESTIGATORY PowERS oF THE 
UNITED STATES CoNGRESS, H.R. REP. No. 1040, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
112. S. 2350, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CoNe. REc. H9774 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988). 
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House or any joint committee or committee, 113 suffered this fate. More modest 
reforms proposed in the wake of Iran-Contra likewise faded out of sight with 
the passage of time. 
Congress' failure to reform the 1857 scheme does not necessarily mean that 
expanded judicial enforcement is inappropriate. Much the same can be said of 
executive branch opposition to a broader judicial role in information access 
disputes. Nonetheless, judicial enforcement is problematic. To begin with, courts 
may be unwilling to assume a broad role in the resolution of information access 
disputes, especially those raising executive privilege issues. Furthermore, politi-
cal resolution of information access disputes may well serve the needs of both 
elected branches better than judicial determinations. 
A. JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE RESOLUTION OF INFORMATION ACCESS DISPUTES 
Executive branch officials and academic commentators, on occasion, have 
suggested that information access disputes are nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.114 For example, in testifying against the 1975 Congressional Right to 
Information Act, Antonin Scalia, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office 
of Legal Counsel, argued that Act provisions allowing congressional enforcement 
of subpoenas were unconstitutional. 115 Specifically, Scalia claimed that such law-
suits were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. For Scalia, "[s]ev-
eral tests may be applicable here, but the clearest is the lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for assessing the relative importance of a 
Congressional need for information and an Executive requirement of se-
crecy."116 In recent years, however, the Justice Department has shied away 
from this claim. In the Reagan-EPA dispute, the Justice Department conceded 
that "the political question doctrine does not require the Court to abstain from 
adjudicating the issues raised by this action. " 117 In testifying against Iran-Contra 
reform proposals, the Department similarly recognized that, under Article III 
of the Constitution, the courts have authority to decide legislative-executive 
controversies. 118 
This revised position is supported by case law. In United States v. AT&T, 119 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Scalia's absolutist political question 
argument. Noting that ''judicial abstention does not lead to orderly resolution 
of the dispute," the AT&T court concluded that "[t]he simple fact of a conflict 
113. See generally SENATE SELECT CoMM. oN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AcTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, 
S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
114. See Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 5, at 165 (citing authority). 
115. Executive Privilege-Secrecy in Government: Hearings on S. 2170, S. 2378, S. 2420 Before the Sub-
comm. on Intergovernmental Relation.J of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
116-17 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter Executive Privi-
lege]. 
116. ld. at 117. 
117. Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 37, United States v. House of Representatives, 
556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983), cited in Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 5, at 169. 
118. See Boyd letter, supra note 110. 
119. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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between the legislative and executive branches over a congressional subpoena 
does not preclude judicial resolution. " 120 
That courts will not throw out information access disputes on political question 
grounds, however, does not mean that courts will become willing policemen of 
such disputes . The AT&T decision , for example, speaks of the Framers' inten-
tion that such disputes be resolved politically and that the constitutional design 
anticipated that "a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of 
the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective function-
ing of our governmental system.'' 121 Indeed, rather than resolve the AT&T 
dispute, D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal pressured both sides to reach a 
compromise. "[E]ach branch," wrote Leventhal, "should take cognizance of 
an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a 
realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact 
situation . " 122 This they did and the case was dismissed after theJustice Depart-
ment and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reached a political settlement of 
their differences. Similar arguments were advanced by D.C. District Judge 
John Lewis Smith, Jr., in the Reagan-EPA dispute. Claiming that judicial 
intervention in executive-legislative disputes "should be delayed until all possi-
bilities for [political] settlement have been exhausted," 123 the Department of 
Justice's challenge to the subpoena was thrown out on ripeness grounds . In the 
end, recourse to the judiciary accomplished little else than delaying political 
settlements between the executive and Congress . While such delays may encour-
age an already recalcitrant executive branch to resist information action requests, 
Congressional committees are not well served by time-consuming and often 
ineffective court proceedings. 124 
This judicial reluctance comes as no surprise . For better or worse, the courts 
are extremely hesitant to play a leading role in defining executive-legislative 
relations. On such issues as war powers, the veto power, the incompatibility 
clause, and recess appointments, the courts have used justiciability and other 
devices to sidestep resolution of executive-legislative disputes. In this way, "the 
Court maximizes utility among the branches and, thus, minimizes the chance 
of retaliation against its own interests.'' 125 Specifically, by ducking the substan-
tive issues raised in these disputes, the courts have found a " graceful way" of 
avoiding substantive decisions against one or the other elected branch . While 
legislation calling on the courts to participate in information access disputes 
might change the present calculus, this judicial hesitancy nonetheless calls into 
120. !d. at 126. The focus of the AT&T dispute was on justice Department objections to AT&T 
compliance with a congressional subpoena. 
121. /d. at 127. 
122. /d. 
123. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152. 
124. In the AT&T dispute, the subpoena was issued in June 1976. The final binding decis ion 
was not made until December 1977, a full 18 months later . AT&T, 567 F.2d at 123 . 
125. McGinnis, supra note 35 , at 307. 
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question the ultimate usefulness of elected government delegating to the courts 
the power to resolve information access disputes. 
B. THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 126 
Judicial resolution of legislative-executive information access disputes is prob-
lematic· for other reasons. The formal enforcement mechanism of the current 
system-U.S. Attorney prosecution of an executive official for contempt of Con-
gress-is of symbolic, not practical, consequence. Specifically, congressional 
determinations of contempt and executive claims of presidential privilege are 
extraordinarily rare. Instead, the executive and legislative branches negotiate 
with each other in an atmosphere in which each branch is aware of the other's 
ability to raise the stakes and complexity of the negotiating process. Were the 
formal enforcement mechanism to change so that the courts would play a leader-
ship role in resolving information access disputes, there would be a risk that 
political negotiations would be replaced by contentious winner-take-all battles 
between the branches. 
The Justice Department has opposed various proposals to expand judicial 
authority in this area for precisely this reason. Assistant Attorney General Scalia 
testified in 1975 that such reform proposals are "bound to multiply the instances 
in which the executive . . . will be constrained to conclude it is his duty to 
[invoke executive.privilege and] withhold the information." 127 Scalia, moreover, 
perceived that such an increase in executive privilege claims would prompt 
Congress to respond in kind, invoking its enhanced civil subpoena enforcement 
authority. Similar concerns were raise in 1989 by Acting Assistant Attorney 
General Thomas Boyd. In expressing justice Department opposition to proposed 
civil subpoena reforms with a limited executive privilege exception, Boyd argued 
that to compel the President to assert executive privilege to avoid judicial involve-
ment, the bill would prematurely involve the president in controversies that 
should be settled by congressional committees and executive officials, obviating 
any need to involve the President and the full House or Senate. 128 
Congress too has been sensitive to these concerns. The 1989 Iran-Contra 
reforms, for example, were modified to exempt executive branch officials acting 
under the direction of their department or agency. Although this weakened 
reform proposal undermined the statutory intent to limit executive branch con-
trol of subpoena enforcement to instances where the president is willing to assert 
executive privilege claims, the bill sponsors nonetheless saw this as a step in 
the right direction; it signaled to agency heads and the Attorney General, who 
under the bill needed to sign off on agency refusals to withhold information, 
the presumptive impropriety of executive branch refusals to share information. 
That Congress was willing to drastically moderate its original proposal, as well 
126. The title of this subsection is borrowed from LoUis FISHER, THE PoLITICS OF SHARED PowER 
(2d ed. 1987). 
127. Executive Privilege, supra note 115, at 70-71 (testimony of Antonin Scalia). 
128. Boyd letter, supra note 110. 
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as its eventual failure to enact any reform measure, speaks to Congress' recogni-
tion of the pitfalls of an expanded judicial role. 129 
House and Senate oversight committee staffers, as well as counsel for the 
House and Senate, prefer the current arrangement to a system of increased 
judicial enforcement, especially when possible executive privilege claims are at 
issue. For former Senate counsel Michael Davidson: "Members do not want 
courts to weight the executive's claim of privilege against Congress' claim of 
need. This would vest enormous powers in the courts to determine and balance 
Congress' needs and the executive privilege. Congress needs to determine its 
needs for itself." 130 Linda Gustitus, former Staff Director and Chief Counsel 
of the Senate Oversight Subcommittee of Government Management, offered a 
somewhat more pragmatic explanation of Congress' reluctance to expand civil 
enforcement through the courts. Noting that Congress is "well served by nonju-
dicial enforcement because its available powers are sufficient,'' Gustitus thought 
judicial enforcement less desirable because "of the risks [of determinations that 
favor executive interests] and delays." 131 Reed P. F. Stuntz, former counsel to 
the Oversight Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee, echoed 
these concerns. For Stuntz, the issue was not the adequacy of congressional 
power to obtain information, but the willingness of committee chairs and staffers 
to aggressively pursue information. 132 
B. NoNJUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES AND THE WoRKABILITY 
OF THE CuRRENT SYSTEM 
Drawbacks to an enhanced criminal or civil system do not demonstrate the 
workability of the current system. Theodore Olson, former Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, perceives that "[t]he system works 
very well for those in Congress, but for those in the executive it is not so good. 
All the leverage is in Congress' hands [and the executive] ... winds up giving 
up the information and caving in because those who hold the information are 
not up to the fight. " 133 For Olson, who prefers enhanced judicial enforcement 
over the current scheme, "a mechanism should be in place to allow principled, 
neutral mechanisms for dispute resolution. " 134 In sharp contrast, some congres-
sional overseers and counsel perceive that the system works to the executive's 
advantage. Reed Stuntz, like Olson, sees the issue as one of institutional will. 
Unlike Olson, however, Stuntz perceives that most members and staffers are 
unwilling to battle the executive for documents. 135 An explanation for why Con-
gress may not press the executive for information, suggested by former House 
129. 134 CoNe. REc. 811,229 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1988). 
130. Davidson Interview, supra note 101. 
131. Gustitus Interview, supra note 101. 
132. Stuntz Interview, supra note 99. 
133. Telephone Interview with Theodore Olson, former Assistant Attorney General for the Office 
of Legal Counsel (Mar. 24, 1994). 
134. /d. 
135. Stuntz Interview, supra note 99. 
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Counsel Charles Tiefer and Congressional Research staffer Mort Rosenberg, 
is "that many members are unaware of the full extent of their oversight preroga-
tives and, thus, they press less than they might for executive disclosure. " 136 
These competing views of legislative and executive power can be reconciled 
in one of two ways. One explanation is that Congress frequently does not push 
as hard as it can, but when it does, the executive is at a disadvantage. A second 
(and not necessarily) conflicting explanation is that, while most in Congress 
and the executive see the system as workable, vigorous advocates for both execu-
tive and legislative power are apt to be more aware of weaknesses in their own 
branch's approach to information access disputes. Without determining whether 
either or both of these propositions are correct, the ability of nearly every infor-
mation access dispute to be resolved politically speaks both to Congress' power 
to get the information it needs without resorting to the 1857 statutory scheme 
and the executive's willingness to work with its congressional overseers. This 
state of affairs helps to explain the failure of court-centered reforms as well as 
nonjudicial alternatives. 
1. Congressional-Executive Relations 
Congress, as suggested above, almost always gets the information it wants 
without having to resort to subpoenaing of executive officials or to contempt 
of Congress findings. Executive compliance, however, does not mean that the 
executive is convinced of the appropriateness of the information access request. 
Instead, Congress' success is often a byproduct of the numerous weapons in 
its arsenal that can be used to punish recalcitrant executive branch officials. 
Congress, among other things, may publicly embarrass executive branch offi-
cials, hold up confirmation hearings of presidential nominees, and enact legisla-
tion that restricts agency operations. 
These congressional powers are potent. For example, executive branch offi-
cials have no interest in seeing the newspaper headline "Congress Subpoenas 
Documents, " 137 nor do they want to be publicly humiliated before an acrimoni-
ous legislative hearing. When an agency official is called to testify, committee 
members are put in a position of some strength over that individual. If a dispute 
over information access is going on at the time, the hearing is the committee's 
chance to put a great deal of political and personal pressure on the witness. 
The success of this technique has been attested to by committee staffers. The 
former general counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Britt 
Snider, commented that, "the intelligence agencies withhold such information 
. . . at their own peril. I have found the prospect of being criticized by the 
Committees to be a very compelling motivation for most agencies .... " 138 
Along the same lines, agencies seem particularly willing to work with Congress 
136. Shane, supra note 63, at 201-202 (describing comments of Charles Tiefer and Mort Rosen-
berg). 
137. Gustitus Interview, supra note 101. 
138. Letter from L. Britt Snider, General Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
to Peter M. Shane Uuly 10, 1990) (on file with author). 
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when the nomination of a high-ranking agency official is held up, pending 
executive branch compliance with oversight requests . This is precisely what 
occurred with Clinton's choice for head of the Justice Department's Environ-
ment Section, Lois Schiffer, during Congress' investigation of environmental 
crimes enforcement. 139 
Executive branch complicity with nearly every information access request, 
however, makes it unnecessary for Congress to invoke these powers on a regular 
basis. According to a 1974 Senate Judiciary Committee study, "executive refus-
als to provide information to committees .. . amount to fewer than thirty per 
year out of what are likely to be hundreds of thousands of requests.'' 140 While 
this study is dated, executive branch compliance remains the norm. 
The question of whether executive branch interests are served through such 
regularized compliance remains. The answer is a qualified yes. At the agency 
and departmental level , it is critically important to maintain good relations with 
legislative overseers . Consequently , it is rarely sensible to place abstract princi-
ples of separation of powers ahead of day-to-day working relationships . Further-
more, there is often as much or more of an identity of interests between agency 
officials and legislative overseers as there is between these officials and Office 
of Legal Counsel attorneys who are interested in protecting the prerogatives of 
the presidency writ large. 141 During the environmental crimes dispute, for exam-
ple, legislative staffers saw the EPA as a cooperative participant in legislative 
efforts to oversee Justice Department operations. 142 
This sharp divide between the Justice Department and the EPA approaches 
to information access requests reveals the complexity of describing executive 
branch interests . While an academic debate rages over whether the executive 
is a unitary entity, 143 executive branch operations often resemble a hydra. In 
other words, for Justice Department and White House attorneys interested in 
the preservation and expansion of presidential power, the current system may 
appear in a state of disrepair whereas for agency officials and department heads, 
the current system may reflect an appropriate quid pro quo for legislative appro-
priations and delegations of authority. 
Were the executive interested in protecting presidential prerogatives from possi-
ble legislative overreaching, the current set of presidential memoranda andJ ustice 
Department procedures would need significant alteration . Under the current re-
gime , the threshold determination of whether an information request raises a 
"substantial claim of executive privilege" rests with those who have the least 
interest in asserting an executive privilege claim against congressional overseers : 
the department and agency heads. While presidential and Justice Department 
materials provide guidance as to what types of legislative requests are problem-
139. See Stuntz Interview, supra note 99. 
140. Shane, supra note 63 , at 201. 
141. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text. 
142. Stuntz Interview , supra note 99. 
143. Su grotrally Symposium , Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law , 15 CARDOZO L. REv . 21 
(1993) . 
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atic, 144 there is little reason to think that agency heads will place these values 
ahead of maintaining good day-to-day relations with their congressional overseers. 
That the White House andj ustice Department have not sought to alter the current 
system is also telling. Indeed, attempts to improve ''coordination and comm unica-
tion among Federal legal offices" through the Federal Legal Council have been 
largely abandoned, with the Council doing little more than providing "an 'oppor-
tunity for the general counsels to get to know each other.' " 145 Apparently, as 
Nelson Lund, former Office of Legal Counsel and White House counsel attorney, 
has observed, the costs of such centralization are outweighed by the benefits of 
ad hoc utility maximization: 
The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office 
of the presidency [are] largely abstract, since they ... consist primarily of fidelity 
to a certain theory of the Constitution .... These costs of pursuing a serious defense 
of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. The costs would 
include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing 
purposes, the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their 
allies, and the sheer expenditure of time by extremely busy people on uninvitingly 
dry legal issues. 146 
In the end, the executive, whether well-served or not, has strong incentives to 
maintain the status quo. 
2. Nonjudicial Alternatives 
The interests of each branch in maintammg the current system certainly 
explains the failure of court-centered reform proposals that shift decisionmaking 
authority away from the elected branches and to a third party. These interests 
also serve as a backdrop to examining nonjudicial alternatives. Three such 
proposals have been advanced over the past decade by the American Bar Associa-
tion and the Administrative Conference of the United States, namely: (1) re-
forms in congressional procedure designed to make legislative committees more 
sensitive to executive branch interests; 147 (2) the establishment of nonbinding 
third party mediation to resolve executive-legislative disputes; 148 and (3) the 
establishment of a modus vivendi, designed to "enhanc[e] the branches' recogni-
tion of [the] various forms in which information may be shared that may accom-
modate the branches' respective interests.'' 149 
There is much to commend in each of the three proposals. Reforms in congres-
sional procedure, especially reforms regarding legislative investigations that may 
144. 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1989). 
145. Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigating Authoriry, 68 
jUDICATURE 70, 77 (1984). 
146. Lund, supra note 70, at 35. 
147. See Arthur E. Bonfield & James F. Rill, Joint Report and Recommendations to the ABA 
House of Delegates from the Section on Administrative Law and the Section of Antitrust Law 
(Aug. 1988) (on file with author). 
148. See id. 
149. Shane, supra note 63, at 233-34. 
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hamper ongoing criminal cases, are designed to avoid executive privilege dis-
putes through a self-policing mechanism. The problem with these proposals, as 
pointed out by former Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress staffer 
Larry Evans, is that it is unrealistic to expect that Congress will unilaterally 
adopt rules that limit its power to investigate executive branch operations. 150 
It is also unrealistic to think that third-party mediation is a viable alternative. 
The problems of delegating decisionmaking authority to a third party, which 
plague judicial enforcement proposals, are likewise present in mediation propos-
als. While the mediation may be technically nonbinding, it is nonetheless an 
important symbolic precedent. 
What then of a modus vivendi in which each branch agrees to a set of proce-
dures designed to resolve interbranch disputes more effectively? The problems 
of delegating authority to a third party, as well as those of one branch unilaterally 
giving up power, are not present here. Nonetheless, the modus vivendi proposal 
is a political non-starter. Legislation would have to be enacted or both branches-
through changes in legislative rules, as well as an executive order binding execu-
tive operations-would have to formally embrace changes in existing procedure. 
Considering that both branches are satisfied with the current arrangement and 
that neither branch wants to make front-end concessions about how they will 
bargain with the other, the prospect of such reforms is unimaginable. 
IV. Conclusion 
The dance that takes place between legislative and executive interests over 
information access will persist. Congress, for the most part, will get the informa-
tion it wants without objection. In rare cases, the executive will object and some 
accommodation will be reached. 151 Whether the executive objects as much as 
it should and whether these accommodations are sufficiently sensitive to the 
competing constitutional interests of the elected branches are subject to debate. 
Also subject to debate is whether the accommodation process is more protracted 
than it needs to be. What is not subject to debate is that neither Congress nor 
the executive have sought to tinker with the current system. This observation, 
of course, does not mean that the system works as well as it could or should. 
Nonstatutory reform proposals, for example, promise improvements on the cur-
rent arrangement without the costs of expanded judicial review. Yet, with both 
branches seeing their interests served by the current system, the prospects of 
such improvements are rather bleak. Unless and until Congress or the executive 
seriously pursues reform, the system is not likely to change and reform proposals 
are not likely to be taken seriously. 
150. Telephone Interview with C. Lawrence Evans, former staff member of the joint Committee 
on the Organization of Congress (Mar. 24, 1994 ). 
151. The Clinton White House's December 21, 1995, decision to drop its objections to the Senate 
Whitewater Committee subpoena is an example of this phenomenon. 
